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ABSTRACT

Tolman, Justin A. M.S., Purdue University, August 2012. Developing a Forensic Method
of Acquisition and Analysis of the Motorola Xoom Tablet. Major Professor: Marcus
Rogers.

There is currently no forensically sound method for analyzing the Motorola
Xoom tablet. The purpose of this research is to determine whether a forensically sound
method can be developed for the Motorola Xoom tablet running the Ice Cream
Sandwich Android operating system. This research is important for investigators as the
more forensically sound method offers greater protection relating to an individual’s
privacy rights. Furthermore, tablets are a relatively new form of digital devices that are
rising quickly in the public. This research sets the groundwork for investigating tablets in
a forensically sound manner. The tablet is used in such a way as to emulate the real use
of such a device. Sources of evidence such as images, web browsing, WiFi information
and email accounts are used as test objects. The research minimizes manual user
interaction, delivers an outline of what can be acquired and the forensic integrity of
such items upon recovery, and the reason for any changes to the device. Furthermore,
this research presents questions for further research relating to the topic.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

As digital devices become more prevalent in society old crimes are being
committed in new ways using computers, laptops, cell phones, tablets, and any other
type of device capable of digital information storage or processing (Clifford, 2006). In
recent years there have been significant increases in digital crimes being committed
(HITCIA, 2011). It is important that law enforcement’s digital investigators have available
the information they need to combat these new methods of committing crime.
One device playing a part in these new methods is Tablets. Tablets are rising in
popularity and forecasted to represent twenty-three percent of all computing devices
(excluding phones) by the year 2015 (Epps, 2010). With increased tablet market share,
investigators may see a rise in the crimes being committed with tablet devices.
Tablets and other mobile devices pose a new problem for digital investigators as
there are many different models and mobile devices update both software and
hardware very quickly. Mobile devices are designed to be connected to a live network
while on, this increases the risk of remote wiping of evidence as well as creating issues
with evidence retrieval.
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One of the most common crimes investigated by digital investigators is viewing,
distribution and production of child pornography (BJS, 2007). One common way for
people to obtain child pornography is via the internet, and specifically with torrent
programs. Torrent programs allow users to download files from other users across the
internet peer to peer. With the increase in high speed data cellular networks these
programs are present in mobile device market places. This allows users to download
illegal material, such as child pornography, directly to a mobile device.
With the possibility of mobile devices being the primary device for obtaining and
storing illegal content, investigators must take steps to examine these devices in a
forensically sound manner. Investigators may not be able to rely on traditional
computers for evidence.
Unfortunately, the investigator may not have the tools or the information
necessary to recover evidence in a forensically sound method from a mobile device. The
technical and legal methods and procedures on traditional computer forensics have
changed little in the last few years. The differences in methods for creating physical
images of evidence across different operating systems and manufactures are minimal. In
contrast, methods for obtaining evidence from mobile devices may differ significantly
from device to device. The technical issues and legal problems that come with mobile
devices are always changing and it can prove difficult for investigators to maintain the
proper tools and training to keep pace with the change.
This chapter gives the basic outline of the research that will attempt to address
that problem. It states the problem being researched, the research question, the scope
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and the significance of the research. Also included are the definitions, assumptions,
limitations and delimitations with this research.
1.1 Problem Statement
There is currently no forensically sound method for analyzing the Motorola
Xoom tablet. This can cause issues relating to individual’s Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights.
1.2 Research Question
Can a forensically sound method be developed for acquisition and analysis of the
data contained within the Motorola Xoom Tablet running the Ice Cream Sandwich
Android operating system?
For the purposes of this research, a forensically sound method will be a method
that obtains the evidence with minimal changes by the investigator to the device. It will
also be a method that when repeated on separate devices achieve the same result.
1.3 Scope
The research develops a forensically sound method of acquiring and analyzing
the data contained within the Motorola Xoom Tablet. The tablet is running the Android
operating system Ice Cream Sandwich version 4.0.4. Version 4.0.4 is the latest version of
Ice Cream Sandwich. The method is using tools and software commonly or freely
available to law enforcement officers. The method adds as little cost (both in time and in
money) to the officer as significant increases in either area may result in the method
being ignored.
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1.4 Significance
The significance of this research is that it provides investigators with a method of
acquiring and analyzing data from Android tablets in a forensically sound manner. On
the spectrum of forensics, you have “traditional” computers on one end, where the
methods and the reliability are very strong. On the other end of the spectrum, you have
cell phones where there are rapid changes in hardware and software. These changes,
combined with the constant connection to a network, cause forensically sound methods
to lag behind current technology.
The operating system landscape in the PC world is primarily Windows. Ninetytwo percent of the market runs Windows (Netmarketshare Desktop, 2012). This
distribution means an investigator can know only Windows and successfully investigate
the vast majority of their caseload.
The mobile device operating system landscape among smart phones is much
more diverse. IOS controls sixty percent, Android nineteen percent, and Java ME fifteen
percent of all mobile devices accessing the internet (Netmarketshare, 2012). This
diversity of smart phones, combined with the amount of non-smart phones, means the
investigator needs a wide range of training when dealing with mobile devices.
Tablets fall in the middle of this spectrum. They store data much like a laptop or
personal computer yet function like a cell phone. Currently, many investigators
approach tablets the same way as they approach cell phones not supported by forensic
examination devices. The officers simply thumb through the tablet looking for evidence.
This method means that the investigator may alter the evidence, and may miss potential
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evidence such as deleted or hidden files. They may also miss evidence simply due to lack
of familiarity with the device file structure.
As more and more people begin to use tablets in their everyday lives tablets will
also be used more in the commission of crimes. My research aids in the investigation
process by developing a set of steps and procedures that an investigator could follow to
search an Android tablet for evidence in a forensically sound manner.
1.5 Assumptions
The following assumptions are being made:
•

The Motorola Xoom is a fair representation of an Android Tablet.

•

The Ice Cream Sandwich Operating System is a fair representation of the Android
Operating System.

•

The results and methods obtained may be applied to other Ice Cream Sandwich
devices.

•

A physical acquisition of the Xoom is possible.
1.6 Limitations

The following limitations are being made:
•

This research is limited to finding a forensically sound method of acquisition and
analysis of the data.

•

Specific app research is limited to apps listed in the methodology section.

•

For data recovery the research is limited to recovering deleted files
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•

The primary focus of this research is developing a method for the uses of law
enforcement.
1.7 Delimitations

The following delimitations are being made:
•

Other Android operating systems are not be evaluated in this research.

•

User modified Android operating systems are not being evaluated in this
research.

•

Advanced forms (e.g. more than deletion or renaming) of data obfuscation are
not addressed.

•

The specific needs of military or business forensics are not addressed.
1.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter introduced research boundaries and definitions that will govern this

study. The scope of the study and the significance of this study to the law enforcement
community were also covered in this chapter. It also outlined important topics such as
the assumptions, limitations and delimitations of the research.
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter looks at the history of digital forensics as well as the legal and
technical environment in which the research was conducted. The literature review will
give the significance of this thesis research background and stability.
2.1 Computer Forensics – Technical Background
Forensic investigations historically have a basic four-step process when dealing
with evidence. The evidence must first be collected or seized to maintain its integrity as
evidence. Investigators examine the evidence using the required tools or methods. The
results of the examination are then analyzed and the conclusions are then reported
(NIST, 2006). This process combined with chain of custody procedures will help
persuade the court that the integrity of the evidence has been maintained (Kruse, 2005).
This process occurs for all items of evidence in any investigation whether the evidence is
fingerprints or digital data on a hard drive.
Computers store data on non-volatile storage media called hard disk drives. Data
on a hard disk drive is stored by placing positive or negative charges that represent ones
and zeros to a set of spinning plates or platters. The computer’s software interprets
these ones and zeros into information the individual can use. Data typically remains on
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the drive, even if the user deletes the data. When new data overwrites the old,
the old data is gone (Carrier, 2005).
The collection process for digital evidence found on a computer’s hard drive may
include two basic parts. First the physical drive may be collected to preserve the original
evidence, and second the data (the actual evidence) contained on the drive must be
collected for analysis.
To collect the physical drive traditionally The United States Secret Service
recommends investigators pull the power plug from the computer (United States Secret
Service, 2010). This action immediately cuts power to the computer, and thus the hard
drive, preventing it from writing or erasing data from the drive. The data is now
preserved on the hard drive at the exact moment power was removed. This method,
however, can cause issues if the drive is password protected, has encrypted volumes, or
had evidence that is now lost when the volatile memory disappears.
To examine the data the suspect drive is removed from the computer and
connected to a write blocker. A write blocker is a device that prevents the examination
computer, or the user, from writing or changing data on the suspect drive (Carrier,
2010). Using specialized software, the investigator then creates an image file that is an
exact copy of the drive. The investigator can verify that the drive image is an exact copy
by comparing the MD5 hash values (NIST, 2006). If the hash value of the suspect drive
and the new image match, then the process was successful. This duplicate image allows
the investigator to analyze the data without risking damage or modification to the
original data.
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Hard drives are non-volatile media, which means they maintain the data
contained on them even after power is lost to the drive. Computers also use memory to
store live or volatile data. This data is what is currently in use by the system and requires
that power be present. The data does not remain when the device loses power (Harris,
2010).
Due to the unchanging nature of the hard drive architecture, collection and
examination methods of a computer system have changed very little. This reliability is in
direct contrast to the mobile area of forensics. A legal background of digital forensics
must be established before the issues facing mobile forensics can properly be discussed.
2.2 Computer Forensics – Legal Background
Computer technology entered very quickly into the population and with that
technology the ability to commit crimes in new ways emerged. Furthermore, as people
begin to use digital devices to manage more of their lives, vast amounts of information
about that individual may be stored on their computer. Thus the data contained within
the computer can be a valuable source of evidence. However, the digital nature of the
evidence and the amount of information contained has raised legal concerns on how
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution govern digital
investigations (Kerr, 2005).
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution sets up the basic rules for how an
investigation can happen and states,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated and no
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Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized. (U.S. Const. amend. IV)
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution contains what is called the due
process clause, which states,
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. (U.S. Const.
amend. XIV)
While investigating a “traditional” crime one can easily specify where to look and
what to seize. It is also fairly simple to define limitations on where the investigators can
search. This specific language of what to search for and where exactly to search for it
prevents law enforcement from using broad language warrants that may violate a
person’s privacy (Marron v. United States). When dealing with digital evidence however,
writing a specific warrant to limit the scope of a search can prove difficult (Kerr, 2006).
When searching for digital evidence the warrant should narrow the scope by
defining the type of evidence, relating to a specific criminal activity sought. The file type
to be searched may also be specified depending on the nature of the suspected criminal
activity (United States v Carey, 1999). However, the location cannot be any more
specific than the hardware investigators are allowed to search, such as a hard drive, a
USB drive or CD. The actual physical location of evidence on digital media is not known
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till after examination and analysis. This lack of knowledge requires the investigator to
search the entire drive (United States v. Mann, 2010).
There are exceptions to the Fourth Amendment search and seizure rules and one
such exception is the plain view exception. The plain view exception has three criteria
that must be satisfied to be held as valid. First, the item must be in plain view. Second,
the incriminating nature of the item must be immediately apparent. Thirdly, the officer
also must be in the location legally. This would include public locations, warrants or
consent (Horton v. California, 1990).
The plain view exception is a debated legal principle in the digital world and
requires the investigator to tread carefully when finding incriminating evidence that
may be outside the scope of the warrant. United States v. Carey is an example of the
plain view exception improperly applied.
Carey was being investigated for possession and transportation of cocaine. The
officers seized Carey’s computer to search for evidence of drug trafficking. During the
course of the examination the investigator discovered an image of child pornography.
The court found that the investigator then abandoned the original search and began
searching for child pornography. The child pornography evidence was suppressed
(United States v. Carey, 1999).
United States v. Wong illustrates the proper execution of the plain view
exception in a digital case. Wong was being investigated on charges of murder. His
computer was seized to be searched for evidence of murder. During the course of the
digital investigation, the investigator came across an image of child pornography. He
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made note of the image and continued on with his search for evidence relating to the
murder case. The investigator then used the images found in plain view as probable
cause to obtain new warrants to search for child pornography. The motion to suppress
was denied (United States v. Wong, 2002).
This exception is important to consider when investigating digital crimes as the
investigator will need to open and view many (if not all, through the use of forensic
software) files thought to contain data of evidentiary value. The potential for accidental
discovery or the violation of a suspects privacy rights is high (Chang, 2007). Until the
courts come to a decision that can be applied to every case, the investigator must
exercise caution.
This discussion has described the technical and legal methods used to seize and
search evidence found in a digital environment, as well as protect the suspect’s privacy
and due process rights as outlined in the United States Constitution. The issues
specifically facing digital mobile device forensics and how they differ from traditional
computer forensics must also be addressed.
2.3 Mobile Phone Forensics – Technical Background
The National Institute of Standards and Technology defines mobile phone
forensics as, “the science of recovering digital evidence from a mobile phone under
forensically sound conditions using accepted methods” (NIST, 2007, p ES-1). This is not
an easy criterion to accomplish as release cycles for cell phone models are short, and
the amount of variations and varieties of operating systems and hardware are many
(NIST, 2007).
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The variation in hardware and software combined with connection to a live
network pose new problems. One problem is power failure, which can cause security
protocols to reactivate. Another problem is remote wiping of key data (Marwan, 2006).
These problems mean investigators face issues in both training and time limitations
when attempting to examine a mobile phone or device on a live network.
Mobile phone devices use solid-state flash memory because it takes less power
to operate, is smaller than a hard disk drive of equal storage capacity, and is not
susceptible to shake damage (Regan, 2009). Solid-state drives do not use platters and
have no moving parts. While the same basic process and methods for analyzing a hard
disk drive apply to a solid state drive, there are some differences that can both aide and
hinder and investigator.
Solid-state drives do not write magnetic charges to a disk. Instead, they store a
charge, one electron, in a series of gates that represent ones and zeros. Because of this
gate system there is a limited amount of writing available to the drive and so the drive
employs the Flash Transition Layer, which manages where data is written to and
balances the use of gates (Regan, 2009). This functionality is good for the investigator in
that data can stick around much longer as the drive may resist writing back to the
location of deleted content in an effort to preserve the life of the gate. Furthermore,
when someone powers down the device it is possible that the live contents of the
volatile memory are written to the non-volatile memory for storage (Harris, 2010).
However, Solid-state can prove troubling for the investigator because if the data is
properly deleted it is unrecoverable.
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Currently, there is very little support of physical acquisition of mobile devices.
When dealing with traditional PCs, investigators have easy access to the drives
themselves and, when attached to a write blocker, the data can be retrieved easily and
safely stored as a physical image. Mobile devices are typically sealed devices and require
the device to be turned on for the tools to extract the data. Turning the mobile device
on may make changes to the device, and it also connects the device to the live network
introducing the problems previously stated. Physical acquisitions are much more
difficult on mobile devices as they require specialized hardware or software and more
training (Curran, 2010).
Logical acquisitions of mobile devices are much more common than physical
acquisitions. Logical acquisitions recover the files and directories of a drive; information
such as call records, text messages and contact lists, this type of acquisition cannot
recover deleted files (Curran, 2010).
Many mobile phones come with security software such as passwords, biometrics,
or pattern locks so the individual can protect the data within the phone. This can cause
issues for investigators if these measures are allowed to activate. One such way these
security measures can be activated is due to power depletion (NIST, 2007).
There are no standards in the United States for what type of adapter a mobile
device must use to charge or transfer data. As an example, the Cellebrite UFED kit
currently comes equipped with over 75 different cords to connect to various types of
phones and mobile devices (Cellebrite, 2012). Depending on agency’s funding, access to
a device such as the Cellebrite UFED may or may not be possible. Without such a device,
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simply finding a cord compatible to extract the data in a forensically sound method may
prove difficult.
Due to the nature of investigations on a mobile phone, an exact forensically
sound reproduction may not be possible. This issue requires investigators to take special
care in documenting all the steps taken during the search of the device (Curran, 2010).
2.4 Mobile Phone Forensics – Legal Background
Issues facing investigators with mobile phones are not just technical, but also
legal. The courts are still struggling to wrap “physical world” court precedents to the
virtual environments and devices (Mayakis, 2010). This comparison does not always
successfully hold up. The Fourth Amendment applied to physical world situations, but
definitions of “search”, “seizure”, “container” and “plain view” when applied to virtual
or digital systems is not easily transferred (Kerr, 2005).
As mobile technology becomes more powerful and more versatile, people are
able to store more aspects of their lives on one device. The mobile phone is not just a
phone it is also an office, a source of entertainment, a camera, a journal, a GPS and
much more. Without a forensically sound method of analyzing mobile devices, privacy
violations can easily occur (Orso, 2009).
Law enforcement has started to seize phones not just for digital crimes but for
just about every crime committed due to the wealth of information contained in them
(New York Times, 2006). The search incident to arrest exception is where many concerns
with privacy and mobile technology come together.
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The search incident to arrest allows an officer to search a person incident to
arrest for illegal items and containers on his person or immediate control to prevent
concealment or destruction allowing evidence to be preserved for trial (US v. Finley,
2007), and to search for weapons that may cause the officer harm or enable escape
(Chimel v. California). In US v. Finley, the court defined a mobile phone as a container.
Mobile phones connect to a live network and as such can be remotely accessed and
even remotely wiped. Due to the threat of evidence destruction, the search incident to
arrest seems to apply.
Opponents of this exception’s application to mobile phones define two different
types of information contained within a mobile device. Coding information is
information used for identifying individuals engaged in the communication, such as
phone numbers. Content-based information is the actual content of the call, message or
email (Orso, 2009).
This distinction between data types is important as each type of information has
a different level of protection under the Fourth Amendment (Mayakis, 2010). Coding
information has very little protections under the Fourth Amendment due to the nonprivate nature of the information. However, mobile device content-based information
may contain emails, text messages and other content about an individual that could
raise privacy concerns.
The field of mobile phone forensics is still evolving. Law and procedure is lagging
behind technology, which requires investigators to take special care when examining
mobile devices (Chang, 2007). Investigators must resist the urge to search a mobile
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phone simply because a mobile phone is there and only search when there is probable
cause to believe that evidence of the current crime has occurred with that device
(Thornton v. United States, 2004).
2.5 Tablets
The tablet PC holds a place in the middle between traditional PC devices and
new mobile devices. Current tablets have powerful processors and large storage drives
to store various forms of media and documents much like a PC. Tablets also have the
ability to operate with or without a live network via Wi-Fi or 3G cellular access.
The concept of tablet computing is not a new one. However, until recently, the
technology and engineering were not to a level to create mass-market success. This
situation changed drastically in 2010 with the release of the iPad (Schedeen, 2010).
From launch, it only took the iPad three fiscal quarters to hit 10 million units
(AAPLinvestors, 2011). Since the iPad, there have been numerous other tablets from
other companies running other operating systems entering the market.
While the iPad dominates the tablet market share, tablets running the Android
operating system developed by Google are starting to take hold (Netmarketshare, 2012).
One aspect that separates Android tablets from the iPad is that any number of hardware
manufacturers can make the tablet device. Android is also open source
(Source.Android.Com, 2012), which allows companies to modify the operating system to
their devices or target audience’s needs. For investigators these differences mean two
devices running the Android operating system may require slightly different methods of
examination.
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The Xoom, released in February 2011 by Motorola, launched running the
Android Honeycomb 3.0 operating system. In January 2012, the device received updates
for the Android Ice Cream Sandwich 4.0 operating system. The Xoom supports web
access and various formats of pictures, videos and audio files (Motorola, 2012). The
Google Play Store, the official app store for Android products, includes apps that allow
access to popular torrent networks (Play.Google.Com, 2012). Because of these
capabilities, the device has the capacity to contain high value evidence.
2.6 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the technical and legal background of both traditional PC
forensics as well as mobile phone forensics. This chapter also introduced tablets as an
emerging technology in need of forensic research.
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CHAPTER 3 METHODOLOGY

This research was searching for a forensically sound method of acquiring and
analyzing the Motorola Xoom Android Tablet for evidence collection by law
enforcement. The method for this research is divided into three main parts: setup,
acquisition and analysis. Each part will be further divided into ordered steps or
objectives.
3.1 Setup
The setup portion of the research required that the Motorola Xoom tablet must
contain information. The following data is what was put on the device for acquisition
and analysis. The “evidence” files placed on the tablet were hashed previous to placing
on the tablet.
1. A factory default Motorola Xoom running Android operating system Ice Cream
Sandwich version 4.0.4 will be used.
2. A primary Google account will be set up. Two emails were sent from the
primary Google account via the device and two emails were received on the
device. Only two emails per account were sent in the interests of time. One
email contained a picture attachment. A secondary Google email account was
setup and two emails were sent from the secondary account via this device,
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and two emails were received on this account. Only two emails per account
were sent in the interests of time. The emails were sent and received to
determine what, if any, information about the emails are saved to the device.
3. Connected to, and saved, two WiFi networks in order to view how and what
information the Xoom stores about WiFi networks. Three web pages were
visited using the default browser on each network. Six pages were used to
populate the history in such a way as to simulate regular use. A connection
was made to the two WiFi networks to see how the Xoom saved multiple
access points.
4. Using the camera on the device, two pictures were taken. Two images were
downloaded from the internet and saved to the Xoom. The images emailed to
the account were saved to the Xoom. The files and save locations were
analyzed to see what if any information could be discovered. Two pictures
and images is assumed to be enough to see a pattern in the placement of
pictures taken with the camera compared to downloaded from the internet.
5. FrostWire 0.9.9, tTorrent Lite 0.9.6, and aDownloader 1.0.8.3 apps were
installed from the Google Play Store. These programs were chosen because
they were the three most downloaded torrent programs in the Google Play
Store at the time of this research.
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3.2 Acquisition
For the acquisition portion of the research, a physical Motorola Xoom Tablet was
used. The tools used were AccessData’s Forensic Tool Kit 3.4 and AccessData’s Mobile
Forensics Examiner Plus 4.6 software. The following steps were taken:
1. Using AccessData’s Mobile Forensics Examiner Plus 4.6 software the
researcher created a logical image of the built-in 32-gigabyte internal solidstate drive.
2. Mobile Forensic Examiner Plus 4.6 stores data collected to AD1 files. Without
changing the data, the Xoom was imaged again, creating another AD1 file and
the hashes compared of each file.
3. Mobile Forensics Examiner Plus 4.6 does not support creating a physical image
of the device, attempts to find a method failed. The analysis of the Xoom was
a logical acquisition.
3.3 Analysis
The analysis portion of the research mapped the data locations within the file
system. The focus of this section was to obtain, forensically, the relevant information
relating to the evidence placed on the device. A forensically sound method of analyzing
the device is a method that can be repeated and requires little interaction from the
investigator, thus minimizing the changes to the device. The analysis required
AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit 3.4 and Android Debug Bridge. The following steps were
taken:
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1. Using the AD1 image created by Mobile Forensic Examiner Plus, a diagram of
the folder and file structure of the Ice Cream Sandwich operating system was
made.
2. Using Android Debug Bridge the researcher dentified a key source where
information about the device could be found. This included email and user
profiles and network information held on the device.
3. Focus was placed on directories that typically contain images, videos, audio
files, and downloads. These directories are: \mnt\sdcard\DCIM\Camera,
\mnt\sdcard\Download, and \mnt\sdcard\Pictures\Screenshot.
4. The researcher analyzed the three installed Android Torrent applications and
identified the default download and share directories, torrent directories,
torrent files, and application settings that may aid an investigator. These
torrent apps were chosen because at the time of research they were the
three most downloaded torrents in the Google Play store.
5. The hash values of the files recovered were compared to the hash values
calculated before the files were placed on the tablet.
6. The researcher describes how copies of deleted images may be obtained.
3.3 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the basic outline of how the research was conducted and
the three primary portions of the research.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND FINDINGS
This chapter contains the findings from the research carried out and will answer
the question as stated in chapter one: can a forensically sound method be developed for
acquisition and analysis of the data contained within the Motorola Xoom tablet running
the Ice Cream Sandwich Android operating system.
This research developed a forensically sound method of acquisition and analysis
of the Xoom, but with limitations. This section also validates the soundness of the
method based on three categories: validity, integrity, and reliability. This section will
also describe the limitations of the method as well as the importance of the research.
4.1 Findings
The research is divided into two sections, acquisition and analysis. Acquisition on
the physical level of the device was not possible. This section will describe the findings
based on a logical acquisition, and describe the limiting factors in why a physical
acquisition was not possible.
The items of evidence placed on the device were acquired successfully. These
items included: account names for both email accounts, information about two different
WiFi access points that were connected to the Xoom, three downloaded images from
email (one of which was deleted), and the two downloaded images from internet via the
default browser. In addition, items such as the files relevant to the three torrent apps
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installed, the three web pages visited, and the folder structure of the Xoom were
acquired successfully.
4.1.1 Logical Acquisition Only
A forensically sound physical acquisition of the device was not possible. The
Xoom does not grant the user root privileges by default. Root permissions are necessary
to gain access to the physical layer of the device. The Xoom’s boot loader is locked and
in order to give the user root privileges (known as rooting) the boot loader needs to be
unlocked. Unlocking the boot loader formats the Xoom, thus destroying the evidence.
A logical acquisition was accomplished using AccessData’s Mobile Phone
Examiner Plus. As it is a logical acquisition of a live system it is not possible to acquire
two exact logical images from the Xoom. The hash values will constantly be changing as
the clock and other services are still operating. The implications of a logical acquisition
mean that the research cannot study the state of deleted files or files protected by root.
4.1.2 Device Email Accounts
The Xoom requires a primary email account, which synchronizes through the
Gmail app. The user also has the option to enter more email accounts through the
Email app. Using the Android Debug Bridge (adb) bugreport both email accounts were
recovered.
-------------- DUMP OF SERVICE account: Accounts: 2
Account {name=tolmanresearch.2@gmail.com, type=com.android.email}
Account {name=tolmanresearch.1@gmail.com, type=com.google}
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The account type com.android.email is the account tied to the email app, while
type com.google is the primary account for the device. These are the only two email
accounts connected with this Xoom.
4.1.3 WiFi Information
The Xoom was connected with two WiFi access points, OptykUnreal and Optyk2
which were saved to the Xoom for automatic connection. Using adb bugreport some
information relating to both access points were recovered.

ID: 0 SSID: "OptykUnreal" BSSID: null PRIO: 3
Protocols: WPA RSN

AuthAlgorithms:

GroupCiphers: WEP40 WEP104 TKIP CCMP
identity:

anonymous_identity:

private_key:

ca_cert:

KeyMgmt: WPA_PSK

PairwiseCiphers: TKIP CCMP
PSK: *

password:

eap:

phase2:

client_cert:

IP assignment: DHCP Proxy settings: NONE

LinkAddresses: [] Routes: [] DnsAddresses: []
ID: 1 SSID: "Optyk2" BSSID: null PRIO: 2
Protocols: WPA RSN

AuthAlgorithms:

GroupCiphers: WEP40 WEP104 TKIP CCMP
identity:

anonymous_identity:

private_key:

ca_cert:

KeyMgmt: WPA_PSK

PairwiseCiphers: TKIP CCMP
PSK: *

password:

eap:

phase2:

client_cert:

IP assignment: DHCP Proxy settings: NONE

LinkAddresses: [] Routes: [] DnsAddresses: []

The adb bugreport command does not return all fields, however the same fields
were complete for both access point records. SSID, PRIO, KeyMgmt, Protocols,
PairwiseCiphers, GroupCiphers, and IP assignment are returned for both records.
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4.1.4 Images
The two images that were emailed to the device were recovered using
Accessdata’s Mobile Phone Examiner. The image’s hash values were maintained through
the emailing process, storage on the Xoom and then extraction.
Table 4.1 Image Hash Values

MD5 Prior To Email To Device

23e207357fe31145b56ce625c48817ff

FileNames
DeletedImage.jpg

MD5 On Device
83a744fb7d61dcc75600815c99affb0b

104c1775c8ca16e08cb0c0cdd65bea69

SecondaryTestImage2.jpg

104c1775c8ca16e08cb0c0cdd65bea69

163c970ab9d53c1acca12f41150563d9

TestImage1.jpg

163c970ab9d53c1acca12f41150563d9

Table 4.1 shows that the actual deleted image was not recovered, however the
Xoom made a copy of the image which was recovered from
mnt\sdcard\Android\data\com.google.android.gallery3d. This cache holds two
thumbnails for each image on the Xoom that is viewed, one small and one medium
sized. The hash values did not match, as it was not the original image. This is significant
as the visual representation still exists on the device, only not as the actual hash match
image. Known File Format filters will not detect contraband images in the
com.google.android.gallery3d cache.
The images that were downloaded from web pages were saved by default to the
mnt/sdcard/Download directory and recovered using AccessData’s Mobile Phone
Examiner Plus. The mnt/sdcard/Download directory is the same directory that files
downloaded from email attachments are saved to by default.
4.1.5 Torrent Apps
The three torrent apps that were installed on the device all created their own
download and share directories when installed on the device. The most significant
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finding when analyzing the torrents was that AccessData’s Mobile Phone Examiner Plus
would not export files with the .iso extension. Multiple attempts were made and failure
to export was the result each time. The directory in which the file was contained was
exported, but not the file itself. The cause of this failure was never found. This lack of
knowledge of what file extensions Mobile Phone Examiner Plus supports is a limiting
factor in how forensically sound this method is.

Figure 4.1 Torrent Directory Structure
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4.1.6 Web History
Web history on the Xoom is not accessible without interacting with the device.
The web history file is protected by root. The history is divided into very generic
groupings: Today, Last 7 Days, Last Month, Older, Most Visited. Without root access to
the actual web history file the exact time and date of each page visit is unknown.
4.1.7 Folder Structure
Figure 4.1 shows the directory structure of the Xoom as it would be before any
user interaction.

Figure 4.2 Directory Structure - No User Interaction
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It is significant that the OxyData folder was created by Mobile Phone Examiner
Plus when the information was being acquired. The directory was empty and the exact
reason for its creation is unknown. This represents a change to the device by the
examination software. Many of the directories contained in the User Data directory are
only used on phones running Ice Cream Sandwich. The directory labeled sdcard is not an
SD card but simply the label given the mountable section of the internal drive. If there is
an SD card in the device it will appear labeled as external1 as shown in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.3 Physical SD card present

4.2 Validity
This study is externally valid as it used tools already accepted by the digital
forensic community. These tools included AccessData’s Mobile Phone Examiner Plus to
extract much of the data, AccessData’s Forensic Toolkit to analyze the AD1 image
created by Mobile Phone Examiner Plus and AccessData’s FTK Imager to create and
compare hash values of files.
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To acquire and analyze information such as the email accounts and WiFi
information the Android Debug Bridge (adb) was used. By using the read only command
adb bugreport > <file> information about the email accounts and saved WiFi
connections were acquired without manual interaction with the Xoom. This study has
construct validity as the information that was placed on the Xoom was successfully
recovered, and when appropriate hash values were compared and found matching.
4.3 Integrity
For the method to be forensically sound the evidence must have maintained
integrity. This means the evidence has not been altered to a significant degree in the
execution of the method. This research showed that this method has a high degree of
integrity through minimizing manual interaction with the device, matching hash values
on the images and using read only commands to access key information. However,
certain interactions were unavoidable due to the nature of the Xoom being a live
acquisition.
This method limits the manual interaction to activating USB Debugging mode on
the Xoom and the analysis of web history. The activation of USB Debugging mode is
common practice with Android mobile devices. It is necessary to allow the Mobile
Phone Examiner Plus and adb to communicate with the Xoom. Manual analysis of the
web history is necessary as the files that contain the history are protected by root.
To maintain long term integrity of the evidence as it was when the examination
begins adb can be used to create a backup file of the Xoom. This backup file will
preserve the state of the device at the point the backup was made in a file that can be
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saved. This backup file saves such information as user settings, apps, user files (images,
downloads, etc) web history, etc.
4.4 Reliability
For the method to be forensically reliable the method needs to have the
attribute of repeatability that concludes with finding the same information. This method
satisfies that requirement. The tests carried out in this method were done three times,
each time with the same results. Three examinations were assumed to be enough to
reliable. Furthermore, the use of forensic tools and the same adb commands means that
the same information is being pulled from the device each acquisition.
4.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter covered the findings of the research and then addresses the validity,
integrity and reliability of those findings. The chapter concluded with an explanation of
why this research is important.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS
This chapter covers the conclusions drawn from the research findings and data
collected. This chapter will also address some of the questions that came from this
research as well as possible opportunities for further research.
5.1 Conclusions
The research question was: can a forensically sound method be developed for
acquisition and analysis of the data contained within the Motorola Xoom Tablet running
the Ice Cream Sandwich Android operating system? This research has showed that a
forensically sound method of acquisition and analysis is possible, but with limitations.
The research shows that a physical acquisition of an un-rooted Motorola Xoom
may not possible with current forensic tools and methods. The Motorola Xoom has a
locked boot loader. The action of unlocking the boot loader (which would allow giving
the user root permissions) formats the device. This would destroy the information
found on the device. The devices locked nature means that only a logical acquisition of
the internal hard drive is possible.
The Xoom must be turned on to acquire the data contained on the device, and
settings such as USB Debugger must be enabled manually. Further manual interaction is
also required to obtain information such as browser history since the file containing
browser history is protected by root. The research developed a method for law
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enforcement to acquire and analyze evidence from the Xoom with minimal manual
interaction with the device. This allows for easier and more accurate documentation of
how and where they found evidence. This research also shows that thumbnails of
deleted images are saved on the device, which could not be found via a thumb through
examination.
The method developed here minimizes risk of privacy violations. Email accounts
tied to the device can be recovered directly without risk of accessing the content of
emails. Investigators may then acquire the content of emails via warrant or subpoena,
maintaining evidence integrity and forensic soundness.
The torrent apps create their own download and share directories. These
directories combined with the various file types that a user could download from the
torrent network mean that certain files may not be visible on a thumb through of the
device. This research shows the directory structure of the three most downloaded
torrent apps in the Google Play store, which may give investigators an idea of where to
search for files of evidentiary value. Furthermore, this research showed that Mobile
Phone Examiner Plus would not extract all file types from the device. Further research
into this issue is encouraged, as law enforcement should be aware of possible
weaknesses in Mobile Phone Examiner Plus.
5.2 Importance
This research is important as it sets the groundwork for forensic examinations of
tablet devices running the Android operating system. No method had been developed
for a forensic method of acquisition and analysis of tablet devices running Ice Cream

34
Sandwich. This research developed a forensic method for acquisition and analysis while
generating questions and material for future research.
This method acquires the information necessary with minimal user interaction
thus minimizing the alterations to the device. This allows for an easily documented
analysis procedure that can be repeated with forensically sound results.
5.3 Further Research
The focus of this research was for the purposes of law enforcement and their
specific needs. However, through the course of the research and development of the
method several questions were generated that may be of worth to future researchers.
The answers to these questions would also prove useful to law enforcement in the
future.
In the course of this research, a backup.ab file was created and loaded into the
Android Virtual Device (AVD) emulator. The purpose of this was to see if investigators
could create a backup file of the Xoom, which would be an exact copy of the data
contained on the Xoom, and then restore the device backup file to a virtual device in the
emulator. The investigator could then interact manually with the virtual copy of the
Xoom and not risk damage to the original and best evidence. The backup.ab file created
successfully, however the file was not compatible with AVD.
Currently the AVD emulator only supports up to Android 4.0.3 and this may have
caused the unsuccessful restorations. The backup.ab file is a type of compressed archive,
however no tool could be found to extract the data from the file. Further research into
either the hosting via virtual machine or extraction directly from the backup.ab file may
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yield a more forensically sound method of analysis for tablets running the Android Ice
Cream Sandwich operating system.
AccessData’s Mobile Phone Examiner Plus was used to export the data into an
AD1 image that was then examined in FTK 3.4. It was discovered in this research that
Mobile Phone Examiner Plus would not export .iso files from the device. Further
research into the limitations of Mobile Phone Examiner Plus may help to improve the
validity of this research as well as other forensic research and examinations using this
tool.
A physical acquisition and access to lower level files of the Xoom requires root
access to the device. To gain root access requires that the boot loader be unlocked,
thus formatting the device. What type of format occurs during this process? Is there a
way to bypass this process and still root the device, or access the files protected by root?
Does this feature pose a risk to investigators by giving a user the ability to quickly format
the device before seizure? These questions are some that were generated in the course
of the research relating to the locked boot loader.
5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed the conclusions from the research and its implications to
law enforcement and research. The section also contained suggestions for future
research based on questions and issues that arose during the research.
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APPENDIX
Investigators may be required to install the Android SDK suite on their
examination machine in order to use the Android Debugger (adb). Download the
installer from the following website: http://developer.android.com/sdk/index.html. The
Java Development Kit (JDK) is also required to run Android SDK, JDK can be obtained
from the following website:
http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/java/javase/downloads/index.html.
When the installation is complete open SDK Manager (Start>All Programs>
Android> SDK Manager). Update or Install the following items using the SDK Manager:

Figure A.1 Android SDK Manager
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Adb is a command line tool. Open a command prompt as Administrator and
within the command prompt navigate to C:\Program Files (x86)\Android\androidsdk\platform-tools\. When working with adb you always work from this directory.
Typing adb and pushing enter will display a list of commands available to you in adb.
To test the connection to the Motorola Xoom type adb devices. The Xoom will be
listed with a unique number identifier and labeled as a device. The investigator may see
an emulator listed. If the emulator is listed the investigator may need to add the -d
operator to commands give to point commands at the device.

Figure A.1 ADB Devices

When the device is listed it is ready to receive commands from adb.

